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 (1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit 
such transfer was made; or 
 (2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.2 
 
This provision limits a trustee’s ability to recover pre-petition transfers by placing a bar on the 
recovery of all transfers that do not “benefit the estate.”3  
In In re Incare, the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that 
the trustee could not recover pre-petition transfers found to be actually fraudulent when the funds 
were reimbursed to the debtor company pre-petition.4 In that case, Dr. Nikparvar was the 
principal of both the debtor corporation, Incare, and the corporation that received the fraudulent 
funds, Advanced Urgent Care.5 Dr. Nikparvar admitted in his testimony that he purposely 
transferred funds to Advanced Urgent Care, totaling $1,779,191.51, in order to prevent a 
judgment creditor from seizing Incare’s bank account for a second time.6 The record revealed 
that Advanced Urgent Care had transferred funds, totaling $1,779,738.95, back to Incare prior to 
the commencement of the bankruptcy case.7 The Bankruptcy Court applied section 550 to 
preclude recovery, stating “where there was no diminution of Incare’s assets as a result of the 
Advanced Urgent Care Transfers, the Trustee is not entitled to recover under 11 U.S.C. § 
550(a).”8  
 This memorandum 
addresses the question of whether a trustee may recover an actual fraudulent transfer when the 
funds have effectively been returned to the estate. In short, the answer is no. Section I discusses 
how a survey of jurisdictions reveals that there is a general consensus among circuits that the 
                                                
2 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (emphasis added). 
3 See generally In re Incare, 2018 WL 2121799, *15-*16 (May 7, 2018).  
4 Id. at 16. 
5 Id. at *1–*2. 
6 Id. at *13, *4. 
7 Id. at *4. 
8 Id. at *16. 
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“benefit of the estate” provision serves as a bar on the trustee’s ability to recover funds. Section 
II talks about Bankruptcy Courts’ strong policy against double dipping. Section III explains how 
bankruptcy courts are equitable tribunals and, as such, there is no place for punitive recoveries.  
Discussion 
I. Benefit of the Estate: A Jurisdictional Breakdown 
 A trustee’s ability to recover funds from avoided transfers is limited by the “benefit of the 
estate” provision found in section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code.9 While circuits have 
characterized the limitation differently, the general consensus is that there are two ways to prove 
a “benefit” of the estate: (1) increased payment to creditors, and (2) increased likelihood of a 
successful reorganization.10  
Courts in the Second Circuit have characterized the provision “benefit of the estate” as a 
floor for recovery, not a ceiling.11 The Southern District of New York has repeatedly defined the 
term “benefit” to encompass “both direct benefits to the estate, such as increased distribution, 
and indirect ones, such as increase in probability of a successful reorganization.”12 In In re 
Tronox, the Southern District used the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of estate to affirm the 
expansive reading of the “benefit of the estate” provision, finding that the estate formed at the 
start of the bankruptcy case includes “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as 
of the commencement of the case.”13 This establishes that the interests of the estate stretch 
beyond repayment of creditors.14 However, despite this seemingly expansive reading of “benefit 
                                                
9 11 U.S.C. § 550. 
10 In re Tronox, 464 B.R. 606, 613–14 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
11 Id. at 611–12. 
12 Id. at 613–14. 




of the estate,” the Southern District has opined that a trustee may not pursue recovery of funds if 
the only party that would benefit from such a recovery would be the debtor.15  
 Courts in the Third Circuit frame “benefit” more strictly. Bankruptcy courts in this 
Circuit have opined: “[i]f there is no reorganized entity or creditors to receive post-confirmation 
payment, there may be no benefit to the estate, just benefit to the owners of the debtor.”16 Going 
further, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania explicitly found no reason to invoke the avoidance 
power when the debtor has received the transferred property back because the creditors have not 
been prejudiced.17 This strict construction was affirmed in In re Incare.18 Despite finding that 
thirteen transfers were made with an actual intent to hinder and delay the payment of creditors, 
the court found there was no “diminution of the estate” because the transferee had reimbursed 
Incare pre-petition, and, as a result section 550 precluded recovery.19 
 The Ninth Circuit, however, uses broader language to interpret the “benefit of the estate” 
provision. It notes that section 550 governs the extent that the trustee can recover.20 The Ninth 
Circuit goes on to opine that “[c]ourts construe the ‘benefit of the estate’ requirement broadly, 
permitting recovery under section 550(a) even in cases where distribution to unsecured creditors 
is fixed by a plan of reorganization and in no way varies with recovery of avoidable transfers.”21 
Notwithstanding this seemingly all-encompassing language, in practice, the court applies the 
                                                
15 HSBC Bank USA, Nat. Ass’n v. Calpine Corp., 2010 WL 3835200 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
16In re GGI Props., LLC, 568 B.R. 231, (Bankr. D.N.J. 2017) (citing In re New Life Adult Med. Day Care Ctr., Inc., 
2014 WL 6851258, at *6 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2014); In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 163 B.R. 964, 972 (Bankr. D. Del. 
1994)). 
17 In re Polichik, 506 B.R. 405, 435 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2014) (holding § 550 acts as a bar against a transfer that has 
already been reimbursed). 
18 See generally In re Incare, 2018 WL 2121799. 
19 Id. at *16. 
20 In re Acequia, Inc., 34 F.3d 800, 809 (9th Cir. 1994). 
21 Id. at 811. 
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provision similarly to both the Second and Third Circuits.22 For example, in In re Acequia, the 
court found that recovery would benefit the estate although all creditors had already been paid.23 
Recovery would ensure the debtor company could fulfill its post-confirmation obligations 
pursuant to the reorganization plan by reimbursing the estate for fraudulent conveyance litigation 
costs.24 This rationale is similar to the other circuits because it recognizes successful 
reorganization as another way to establish a “benefit of the estate.”25  
 Accordingly, despite the varying formulations across jurisdictions, the outcomes are 
consistent—if the trustee can prove that recovery will result in additional payments to creditors 
or a more successful reorganization process, then courts will deem the funds sought to be 
recoverable. This is true regardless of whether the transfer was made as a result of actual fraud or 
not.  
II. Strong Policy Against Double Dipping 
Under section 550(d) a trustee only has the right to a “single satisfaction” of claims 
arising under section 550(a).26 “Section 550(d) empowers courts to prohibit a trustee from 
recovering under [s]ection 550(a) from a transferee that has already returned to the estate that 
which was taken in violation of the Code.”27 The purpose of this provision is to prevent a 
windfall to the estate.28 The affect is a strict bar on double recovery.29 Accordingly, a trustee 
                                                
22 Id. (citing In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 163 B.R. 964, 973 (Bankr. D. Del. 1994) (“[T]he unsecured creditors 
will benefit from the enhanced value of reorganized [debtor corporation] by reason of being shareholders of the 
reorganized debtor.”) (quoting In re Centennial Indus., 12 B.R. 99 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding when there was 
a five-year post-petition payment plan, “any recovery by [the debtor] will increase the likelihood of the creditors 
receiving their future payments.... The recovery of [a] preference will be additional security for the fulfillment of the 
debtor's plan.”)). 
23 In re Acequia, Inc., 34 F.3d at 812. 
24 Id. 
25 Id.; see e.g., In re GGI Props., LLC, 568 B.R. at 231 (application in Third Circuit); In re Tronox, 464 B.R. at 613–
14 (application in Second Circuit). 
26 11 U.S.C. §§ 550(a), (d). 
27 In re Sawran, 359 B.R. 348, 352 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007). 
28 See id. 
29 HBE Leasing Corp. v. Frank, 48 F.3d 623, 640 (2d Cir. 1995). 
American	Bankruptcy	Institute	Law	Review	|	St.	John’s	School	of	Law,	8000	Utopia	Parkway,	Queens,	NY	11439	 
 
cannot recover both transferred property and damages; and a trustee may not recover transferred 
property if it has already been returned to the estate by the transferee.30  
Still, in Whitlock v. Lowe the “single satisfaction” provision did not bar the chapter 7 
trustee from recovering funds.31 In Whitlock, the debtor fraudulently transferred funds into his 
sister-in-law’s bank account.32 Following this transfer, and pursuant to the debtor’s request, the 
sister-in-law: (1) transferred $200,000 to a third-party company in order to pay off a debt for the 
debtor, and (2) transferred $32,000 to the debtor’s wife.33 The funds from the two subsequent 
transfers were spent pre-petition.34 As such, the court found that because the funds were not 
available to distribute to creditors there was a harm to the bankruptcy estate and the recovery of 
the funds was proper.35 However, Whitlock is currently being appealed to the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit.36  
Conversely, the Third Circuit found that recovery of actual fraudulent transfers is 
improper if the estate has been reimbursed, irrespective of whether the funds were actually 
available to distribute to creditors.37 In Incare, the principal of the debtor company, Incare, made 
a series of transfers from itself to another company, Advanced, in order to avoid paying a 
judgment against Incare.38 However, later payments from Advanced back to Incare compensated 
the estate for the initial fraudulent transfers.39 Unlike Whitlock, the court in In re Incare did not 
                                                
30 See e.g. In re Sickels, 392 B.R. 423 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2008) (trustee could not avoid a mortgage lien and pursue 
a money judgment); In re Sawran, 359 B.R. at 355 (trustee could not recover funds paid back to debtor pre-petition). 





36 Whitlock v. Lowe, 569 B.R. 94 (W.D. Tex. 2017), appeal docketed, No. 18-50335 (5th Cir. 2018). 
37 In re Incare, 2018 WL 2121799 at *13–*14. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at *4. 
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consider whether the funds were actually available to distribute to creditors.40 The court in 
Incare stopped the inquiry once it determined that the funds were effectively reimbursed to the 
debtor—finding any recovery would constitute double dipping.41  
Under the Incare inquiry the Whitlock Court’s decision to allow the trustee to recover the 
$200,000.00 transfer, despite being used to pay off a debt for the debtor, would likely have a 
different result.42 This is because whether the payment went from debtor to creditor, or from 
debtor to third-party to creditor, the payment was made to fulfill a debt of the estate. Thus, if the 
Fifth Circuit, on appeal, follows In re Incare’s logic, it will most likely apply an equitable credit 
to the claim against the transferee for the $200,000 payment to the creditor.43  
In sum, the Court may apply a strict bar to a trustee’s recovery under section 550 if such 
recovery would constitute double dipping.44 However, the Court may also choose to apply an 
equitable credit for the portion already received and hold the transferee responsible for the 
remaining sum to ensure the estate is reimbursed for the full amount of the fraudulent transfers.45  
III. Bankruptcy Courts are Courts of Equity 
“Bankruptcy courts have long had broad equity power to manage the affairs of debtors, a 
power now codified in Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code.”46  The purpose of the Bankruptcy 
Code is remedial, not penal.47 A bankruptcy court may apply “equitable principles to reduce or 
                                                
40 Id. at *13–*14. 
41 Id. 
42 See Whitlock, 569 B.R. at 104–05. 
43 Id. at *16 (“In this case, I consider it appropriate to give [the transferee] an equitable credit for the money it 
returned to Incare.”). 
44 See In re Sawran, 359 B.R. at 355. 
45 See In re Incare, 2018 WL 2121799, at *16. 
46 Adelphia Recovery Tr. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 390 B.R. 64, 74, fn. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), adhered to on 
reconsideration, No. 05 CIV. 9050 (LMM), 2008 WL 1959542 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2008) (quoting In re Croton River 
Club, Inc., 52 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir.1995) (citation omitted)). 
47 In re Incare, 2018 WL 2121799, at *16 (citing In re Kingsley, 518 F.3d 874, 877–78 (11th Cir. 2008); In re 
Tronox, Inc., 464 B.R. at 618; ASARCO, LLC v. Ams. Mining Corp., 396 B.R. 278 (S.D. Tex. 2008); In re Jackson, 
318 B.R. 5, 27–28 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2004), aff’d, 459 F.3d 117 (1st Cir. 2006)). 
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eliminate the amount of the trustee’s recovery” in instances where recovery of the transfer 
“would result in an inequitable windfall to the bankruptcy estate.”48  
In In re Kingsley, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision to apply 
an equitable credit to the transferee because of payments made to the estate after the transferee’s 
acceptance of an intentionally fraudulent transfer.49 As such, the equitable principles embodied 
by the Bankruptcy Code force the conclusion that funds already reimbursed to the estate are not 
recoverable by the trustee, regardless of actual fraud.  
Conclusion 
  
 A trustee may only recover funds for the “benefit of the estate,” regardless of whether the 
transfer is deemed actually fraudulent. Generally, in order to prove “benefit” to the estate, the 
trustee must show that recovery will either result in a higher payout for creditors, or a more 
successful reorganization.50 Trustees are further limited in their ability to recover via the single 
satisfaction rule.51 Under this rule, courts can bar recovery or issue equitable credits to limit the 
trustee to a “single recovery.”52 These limiting provisions are justified because bankruptcy courts 
are premised on equitable, not penal remedies.53  
 
                                                
48 In re Kingsley, 518 F.3d at 877–78. 
49 See id. 
50 See In re Tronox, 464 B.R. at 613–14. 
51 In re H & S Transp. Co., 939 F.2d at 358. 
52 In re Kingsley, 518 F.3d at 877–78. 
53 In re Incare, 2018 WL 2121799, at *16 (citation omitted). 
